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Sect ion 1 
Introduction 
This paper examines the implementation challenges and 
emerging policy issues relating to the new road safety 
measures taken by the Kenya Government through Legal 
Notice No. 161 of October 2003. The legal notice emphasize 
reduced speeds through use of speed governors, passenger 
safety through compulsory use of safety belts, and reduced 
passenger capacity for more comfort in all PSV vehicles. The 
paper begins with an introduction which provides the context 
of the study, overview of road transport, theoretical 
framework, and methodology. The second section discusses 
road transport and road safety in Kenya, while the third 
section focuses on road safety issues in Kenya. The fourth 
section provides an analysis of the legal notice followed by 
concluding remarks and recommendations 
Study Context 
The paper is one of the outputs of the Institute for 
Development Studies (IDS) research project on 'Research and 
Technical Support to Renewed Road Safety Measures ' in 
Kenya, funded by the FIA Foundation. The primary goal of 
the project is to provide research and technical support to the 
renewed road safety measures with three specific objectives, 
namely: monitoring, evaluating and analyzing the 
implementation of road safety measures in Kenya; offering 
technical guidance to government agencies charged with the 
implementation of new road safety measures; and building 
and strengthening a broad national coalition and partnership 
for implementation of the renewed measures. 
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Overview of Road Transport 
Road transport crashes ranks high among the greatest 
development challenges currently facing many countries of the 
world. The frequency, magnitude and impact of global road 
carnage are generally very worrying. For example, during the 
1990s, the Asian and Pacific region alone registered over 2 
million annual road accident fatalities and about 17 million road 
accident-induced physical disabilities. It is estimated that the 
global economy looses up to US $ 500 billion annually through 
road crashes. 20 per cent of this loss, which is about US $ 100 
billion, occur in the developing and transition countries of 
Eastern Europe. Yet the funding for research and development 
in road safety is just tens of millions of dollars. In essence 
therefore, the annual loss incurred by the developing countries 
as a result of road transport crashes, far exceeds the total annual 
aid and grants received by these countries (Ndungu et al 2004; 
Vinand & Muli-Musime, 2001; Razzak, 1998). 
A recent joint World Health Organization (WHO) and World 
Bank report indicate that road crashes kill 1.2 million people 
annually and injure 50 million more. The majority of these 
people are in the developing countries. Globally, road crashes are 
the second cause of deaths for people aged between 15-29, and 
the third cause of deaths for those falling between ages 30 - 44. 
Infact, road crashes are currently the ninth major cause of deaths 
and disabilities world wide and are projected to rise by 65 per 
cent by the year 2020, placing it third after heart diseases and 
depression, but behind current major killers like Malaria, 
Tuberculosis and HIV/Aids. Although motor-vehicle-related 
crashes in the developed world are projected to reduce by 
30 per cent between the periods 2000 - 2020, it is expected 
to increase by 80 per cent in the developing world. 
Ironically, the developing world has only 20 per cent of 
Working Paper No. 545 
vehicles in the world, but cause up to 80 per cent of vehicle 
related deaths(WHO &World Bank, 2004). 
While these global figures paint a gloomy picture of the 
developing countries in as far as road crashes are concerned, 
they conceal the realities of country-specific road carnage. 
Kenya for example, has experienced phenomenal increase in 
road crashes over the years. Between 1981-1990, road crashes 
in Kenya increased at an average rate of 4 per cent p.a from 
7,250 to 10, 308 while road accident fatalities increased at an 
average rate of 0.9 per cent p.a from 1,720 to 1856 people. In 
1990 alone, Kenya had a casualty per road accident of 1.84. In 
the same year, there were 29 road crashes per 1,000 motor 
vehicles operating in the country and 53 fatalities per 10,000 
motor vehicles. Between 1990 and 1992, fatal road crashes 
increased phenomenally from 17 per cent in 1990 to 21 per cent 
in 1992. Presently, Kenya witnesses an average of 13,000 
crashes annually, out of which 3,000 lives are lost while more 
than 11,000 injuries are sustained annually from road crashes. In 
2002 alone, 13,428 crashes occurred, involving 28,774 people, 
of which, 2782 or 10 per cent lost their lives, and 10, 912 or 38 
per cent sustained serious injuries, while 15,000 or 52 per cent 
were slightly injured. These figures rank road crashes as the 
third leading cause of deaths in Kenya after malaria and 
HIV/AIDS (TTCA, 1994; GOK 1994; GOK, 2003; Odero, etal, 
2003). 
Over the years, the annual cost of road crashes to the Kenyan 
economy has increased significantly. While it was estimated 
that road crashes cost the Kenyan economy Kshs. 100 Million or 
1.7 per cent of the GNP in 1981, by 1997, it was estimated that, 
26 per cent to 52 per cent of the road transport sector earnings 
were lost due to road crashes. Today, the annual average cost of 
road crashes to Kenya's economy is Kshs. 14 billion or 5 per cent 
of the GDP. This far exceeds the annual average cost of road 
crashes to the economies of Third World countries,which 
oscillates between 1 -2 per cent of their GDP (GOK, 2004). 
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Interestingly, road transport is currently the most widely used 
transport mode in Kenya, handling close to 80 per cent of both 
passenger and cargo transportation. Road transport eases 
mobility of the factors of production, creates direct and indirect 
employment, provides income to the government and to the 
road transport service providers, and facilitates linkages within 
the economy. During the period between 1998 and 2002, for 
example, the average contribution of the transport sector to 
Kenya 's economy stood at 8.5 per cent of the GDP, of which 
the road transport sub-sector had the lion's share of 2.9 per cent 
of the GDP. It is projected that between 2003 and 2007, the 
transport sector will grow at an annual rate of 6.26 per cent 
(Ikiara 2005). From the surface of it, this looks meticulous. 
However, when one considers the fact that road transport 
crashes cost Kenya 5 per cent of her GDP, it becomes clear that 
road transport is a net robber of the national economy to the 
tune of 2.1 per cent of the GDP (GOK, 2001:1). 
Given the importance of road transport in the social, economic 
and political life of Kenya as a nation, it is hardly surprising 
that the government has taken several policy measures in order 
to address the problem of road crashes. These measures have 
resulted f rom the realization that a functioning low cost road 
transport service supported by a good road infrastructure, as 
well as informed and disciplined road users, is crucial for 
economic development and poverty alleviation. It is largely 
because of this that Kenya 's Economic Recovery Strategy for 
Wealth and Employment Creation for 2003-2007 regards 
transport as the third pillar of the country's economic recovery 
efforts. 
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Against this background, this study examines implementation 
challenges and emerging concerns with regard to the latest 
road transport safety policy interventions taken by the Kenya 
government through Legal Notice No. 161 of October 2003, 
and subsequent amendments to the Notice. The Notice 
emphasizes reduced speeds through use of speed governors, 
passenger safety through compulsory use of safety belts, and 
regulated load and passenger capacity for more comfort in all 
PSV vehicles. The paper examines the extent to which these 
measures have been successful in reducing road carnage in 
Kenya. 
Theoretical Framework 
Transport network should be understood using an integrated-
systems approach with structural-functional linkages as part 
of the larger system. The sector is important for economic 
development, due to its forward and backward linkages with 
all sectors of the economy. In both urban and rural areas, 
transport facilitates access to places, economic sectors and 
related services, including agricultural inputs. At a sub system 
level, road transport is viewed as a super-structure supported 
by two functional pillars, namely road infrastructure and road 
transportation. The two pillars have a common objective of 
promoting safe and efficient road transport. Each of them is 
built on some institutional foundation. The pillars should be 
strong, with adequate structural and functional linkages 
between them. The efficiency and safety of road transport 
depends on the strength of its supportive functional pillars, 
which in turn depend on the strength of their institutional 
foundations. The strength of each of the institutional 
foundations also depends on the extent to which they embrace 
stakeholder involvement and participation in their activities. 
This theoretical conception of road transport and safety is 
shown in figure 1. 
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Figure 1: The Structural-Functional Linkages in Kenya's Road 
Transport Sector 
Source: Asingo, 2004; The Institutional and Organizational Structure of 
Pubic Road Transport in Kenya p. 5 
In order for the public road transport to efficiently perform, 
the institutional and organisational structures have to be 
efficient. Each component has to play its role and 
meaningfully relate to the other components. 
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Methodology 
This study utilized both primary and secondary data. Primary 
data was obtained largely from baseline surveys conducted in 
Nairobi. A series of discussions were held with key 
stakeholders in the transport sector including the Permanent 
Secretary and chief officers of the Ministry of Transport; the 
Traffic Police Commandant; officials of the Transport 
Licensing Board, Motor Vehicle Inspection Unit, Driving Test 
Unit and Kenya Roads Board; the City Council of Nairobi; 
Matatu Owners Association and Matatu Welfare Association; 
key actors in the insurance industry; as well as matatu drivers 
and commuters among others. The issues teased out during 
these initial discussions were later concretized during a 
stakeholder workshop organized by the Institute for 
Development Studies, University of Nairobi, in collaboration 
with the Ministry of Transport (GOK), at the Nairobi Safari 
Club Hotel on 27th January 2005. Secondary data on the other 
hand was obtained from scholarly publications and relevant 
gov ern me nt d ocu me nts. 
The data obtained both from primary and secondary sources 
have been analyzed largely qualitatively, and presented in a 
descriptive manner. Statistical data have been used only to the 
extent that they demonstrate the magnitude of the problem of 
road crashes. In a nutshell, the findings of this study are only 
preliminary, and will be further refined in the next phase of 
the study which will entail more rigorous and in depth survey. 
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Section 2 
Understanding Road Transport and Road 
Safety in Kenya 
Road Infrastructure Development in Kenya 
Serious development of road infrastructure in Kenya began 
during the colonial period, soon after the completion of the 
Kenya-Uganda railways. Initially, roads served mainly to link 
the settler areas with the railway line for easy transportation of 
agricultural produce from the white highlands to the coast for 
shipment to Europe. At independence in 1963, Kenya had a 
classified road infrastructure network of 4 l,800kms, of which 
l ,811kms was tarmacked. The rest were earth and gravel 
standard roads. (GOK, 2001). 
Road infrastructure network witnessed tremendous expansion 
during the first two decades of independence, through 
government initiatives like the Special Purpose Roads 
Programme (SPRP) and the Rural Access Roads Programme 
(RARP). As a result, by 1980 the entire classified road 
infrastructure network had increased by 51 per cent f rom 
41,800kms to 63,291 kms, while the tarmacked road network 
increased by 393 per cent from 1,811 kms to 8,937kms. Thus, 
the percentage of tarmacked road network grew from 4.3 per 
cent to 14.1 of the entire classified road network between 
1963 and 1980 (GOK, 2001). 
By the 1980s, most of the road infrastructure constructed 
earlier began to deteriorate rapidly. Ironically, rather than 
under taking repairs and maintenance of the existing road 
network, the government's road infrastructure policy seemed 
to favor construction of new roads. It was only in the 1990s 
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when the government made a policy shift towards repair and 
maintenance of existing road network, with limited new 
infrastructure construction. Currently, Kenya's road 
infrastructure network is estimated at 150,600 Kms, of which 
63,291kms is classified while the rest is unclassified. 
Safety Concerns in Kenya's Road Transport 
Legal and institutional framework for road safety in 
Kenya 
Until 1979, road safety was primarily the concern of the 
Kenya police. In response to the increase in road transport 
crashes, the traffic police training was started at the Kenya 
Police College in 1971. In 1974, the traffic branch of the 
Kenya police was set up. In the late 1970s, some 
organizations began to emerge to work with the police on road 
transport safety. These include Safe Driver Awards and the 
Good Samaritans Awards. In January 1975, the ministry of 
Home Affairs set up a Road Safety Council with 
representatives from various ministries and organizations. The 
council however did not last long and was wound up after 
only one meeting. After the council's dissolution, the various 
road safety initiatives remained largely uncoordinated. 
Around the same time, the Kenya Police in partnership with 
the Voice of Kenya (today known as Kenya Broadcasting 
Corporation) radio began media campaigns to sensitize the 
public on road safety. 
By 1979, some few districts like Nakuru and Kericho had set 
up District Road Traffic Committees to deal with road traffic 
issues. Some of the road safety problems noted in the 1970s 
include absence of pedestrian and bicycle lanes, poor road 
infrastructure and road furniture. The persistence of road 
crashes in the 1970s led the Kenya government and the World 
Bank to ag ree to inc lude some equ ipmen t fo r po l i ce 
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enforcement as part of the first highway sector loan during the 
1970/1980 fiscal year. Similarly, in May 1979, the 
governments of Kenya and Finland initiated a joint road 
safety Programme that went on until 1988. It began with an 
initial study phase, which focused on dangerous road 
locations on rural roads in Kenya; differentiated speed limit 
system for Kenyan main roads; and road traffic crashes in 
Kenya. The recommendations of the latter study led to the 
formation of the National Road Safety Council (NRSC), 
which became an umbrella organization that coordinates all 
road safety efforts in the country. NRSC initially had 20 
members, drawn mainly from the representatives of the 
stakeholder organizations. The members were eventually 
reduced to 15. In addition, Provincial Road Safety Councils 
were proposed to coordinate all road safety activities at the 
local level. 
In 1981, the Road Safety Unit (RSU) was established as a 
secretariat for the NRSC. It was located within the Planning 
and Coordination Unit of the Roads Department within the 
ministry of Transport and Communication. Besides secretarial 
work, the mandate of the RSU included technical assistance to 
the NRSC, proposing and actively undertaking road safety 
work, undertaking studies and analysis of road crashes as well 
as advising on road design, maintenance work and general 
town planning. In August 1983, the NRSC in conjunction 
with the ministry of local government set up road safety 
committees in large urban centers. By May 1985, Nakuru, 
Mombasa, Kericho, Kakamega, Kitale, Meru and Eldoret had 
set up Safety Committees. Soon after, the Roads Department 
was transferred from the ministry of transport and 
communications to that of Public Works and Housing, and 
hence RSU became part of the Ministry of Public Works and 
Housing while NRSC remained in the Ministry of Transport 
and Communications. 
Working Paper No. 545 
Coordination of road safety in the 1970s and 1980s thus 
became difficult due to a fragmentation of the existing 
institutional and legal framework. While the ministry of 
transport and communications was responsible for policy 
formulation, and overseeing the affairs of the NRSC, the 
Ministry of Public Works and Housing was responsible for 
planning, design, supervision, construction and maintenance 
of the road infrastructure network. At the same time, the 
responsibility for determining land use in the urban areas laid 
with the Physical Planning Department within the ministry of 
Lands and Settlement. 
Related to this, the various sections of the law on traffic fell 
under different ministries without proper coordination. For 
example, while enforcement of the Public Roads and Roads of 
Access Act was seen as the primary concern of the Ministry 
of Public Works and Housing which housed the roads 
department, the TLB was under the Ministry of Power and 
Communications. At the same time sections of the Traffic Act 
were seen to be under the Registrar o f Motor Vehicles within 
the ministry of Power and Communications. This 
fragmentation made it difficult to harmonize and coordinate 
road safety activities. 
N R S C however, fizzled out due to several problems. First, 
NRSC was set up by a Gazette Notice rather than an Act of 
Parliament, had no central government budgetary allocations 
and hence could not be funded by the exchequer. It therefore 
depended largely on donor funding which eventually dried 
out. Secondly, it lacked institutional l i fe of its own, was 
staffed by civil servants, lacked stakeholder representation, 
and depended on individual wit of the existing staff. Some of 
the commi t t ed civil servants re t i red, whi le others were 
t ransfer red without replacement to depar tments that had 
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nothing to do with road safety. In a sense there was no 
political good will to sustain it, leading to its regrettable 
demise. 
The RSU on its part has remained active and is still housed by 
the Ministry of Roads and Public Works. It compiles and 
stores road accident data identifies black spot sections of the 
road network and suggests remedial measures. Its focus is 
more on what rather than who causes road crashes. It also 
undertakes countrywide public road safety awareness 
campaigns and is in charge of the children's road traffic parks 
countrywide. As part of its efforts to improve on road safety, 
it has currently adopted road safety audit to ensure that newly 
designed roads incorporate safety concerns. 
Evidently therefore, the policy, legal and institutional 
framework for road safety in Kenya has been very weak. 
Besides the legal provisions scattered in various Acts of 
Parliament, there has been neither a coherent policy nor a 
coordinated safety institutional framework. Even the existing 
safety legislation often faces implementation hurdles (Asingo, 
2004). 
Investigation and reporting of road crashes in Kenya 
The Kenya police are responsible for investigating all road 
crashes, collecting accident data, filing road transport accident 
reports and sending copies of the reports (P41 Forms) to 
relevant authorities. A Quarterly Accident Summary Report is 
prepared by individual police stations and sent to police 
headquarters, which uses them to produce the National Road 
Accident Summaries (NRAS). The police take notes from the 
accident scene and use them to fill in the Accident Report 
Form when they go back to the police station. 
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There are at least three problems with the existing road 
accident data collection format. First, the police lack basic 
data collection and compilation equipment like cameras and 
computers and .this compromises the accuracy of their reports, 
which in any case are compiled miles from the scene, 
sometimes several hours after the accident. Secondly, it is 
only the Traffic Police headquarters that receive copies of the 
duly filled in P41 Forms basically for prosecution, insurance 
compensation purposes and for records. This means that the 
relevant government agencies dealing with road safety, 
including RSU have no direct access to data on road crashes, 
and therefore rely on police records. In essence, data collected 
is not used for purposes of sol ving the problem of road safety. 
Thirdly, there are several crashes that remain unreported, 
either because they occur in the absence of the police or the 
police leave the drivers of the involved vehicles to sort them 
out on their own. These problems are compounded by the fact 
that, "the existing training programme for the police in Kenya 
relative to traffic safety matters are inadequate in meeting the 
increasing needs for road safety enforcement" (TTCA, 
1994:124). 
According to the Institution of Highways and Transportation 
(1997), investigations into road crashes should proceed in five 
phases - identification of problems that are related to road 
transport crashes; diagnosis of their causes and situation; 
selection of treatment; design and implementation of remedy 
measures; and evaluation of the performance of the selected 
remedy measures. In addition, the Institution identifies four 
approaches to road accident response: -
(i) Single Site Action, which involves investigating 
specific sites or short lengths of a road, which are 
considered as accident black spots; 
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(i) Mass Action which involves the application of a 
particular type of remedy to locations having 
common accident factors; 
(ii) Route Action, which involves the use of a 
particular remedy to a length of road having 
above average accident rates for that particular 
class of road; and 
(iii) Area Action which is the aggregate of the 
remedial measures over an area 
Road Crashes in Kenya: Causes1 and Casualties 
Serious effort at addressing road safety must proceed from 
two related questions. First, what causes road crashes? 
Secondly, who are the greatest casualties of road crashes? 
With regard to the first question, available data show that for a 
long time, motor vehicle drivers have been the greatest cause 
of road crashes in Kenya, followed by pedestrians, cyclists 
and passengers respectively as expressed in Figure 2. 
Figure 2: Persons Responsible for Reported Road 
Accidents 1992-2003 
1 
6000 No. of 
5000 
Reported 
4000 
Accidents 
3000 • D r i v e r s 
2000 
• P e d e s t r i a n s 
• C y c l i s t s 
1000 • P a s s e n g e r s 
0 • O t h e r s 
Source: Statistical Abstracts 2003 
1 The concept "causes' is used by the Kenya police in recording road 
crashes, without factoring in the issue of attribution. In most cases when 
crash occurs, there can be more than one cause, including the road 
infrastructure. 
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However, this raises more questions about what makes 
drivers, pedestrians, cyclists and passengers to cause road 
crashes in the magnitude and proportions in which they do. 
This will be dealt with later. 
In terms of accident casualties, available data shows that 
pedestrians and passengers are the two greatest casualties. By 
1992, passengers were the greatest road accident casualties in 
Kenya, but in 1993 pedestrians overtook them and maintained 
the lead till 2000. 
Figure 3: Fatal Road Accident Casualties in 
Kenya 1992-2000 
Years 
Source: World Bank Report No. 26444-KE Vol. 2, 2003 
Drivers and road transport crashes 
In a study of road crashes in Leeds, United Kingdom, Carten, 
et al (1989) observed that the main problem among drivers 
which lead to crashes include failure to give way, lack of 
anticipation, loss of control and improper overtaking. They 
noted that the underlying reason for all this is basically over 
speeding, not keeping safe distance, obstruction by parked 
vehicles, overloading, slippery roads, poor visibility and 
wrong judgments. 
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The study established that these problems are equally serious 
in Kenya. Indeed, Kenyan drivers cause crashes largely 
because of behavioral and attitudinal problems. These 
' problems include failure of drivers to give-way to fellow 
drivers and other road users and improper overtaking; lack of 
anticipation, wrong judgments and loss of control while 
driving; not keeping safe distance and making unwarranted 
emergency brakes; careless driving, over speeding and 
violation of speed limits; influence of toxic substance; Stress 
and fatigue due to long hours of work in the quest to meet 
daily collection targets set for them by PSV vehicle owners; 
failure to detect mechanical defaults in their vehicles; and 
obstructive parking. Related to this, there is suspicion and 
mistrust among various categories of drivers. While matatu 
drivers are viewed as crooks, they regard other drivers as 
amateurs and always try to show them that they have superior 
driving skills. Generally, these behavioral and attitudinal 
problems are more acute among PSV drivers. 
In addit ion, there is also the problem of driver training, 
examination and certification in Kenya. There is a weak legal 
framework for driver training and certification. According to 
the Kenyan legislation, prospective motor vehicle drivers can 
receive driving training from any registered driving school or 
from any private individual who holds a driving license for at 
least the class for which one wants to be trained as a driver. 
This means that any one holding a driving license can train 
others how to drive. Further more, there is neither a standard 
curriculum nor set textbooks for drivers. There is also no 
requirement for proof of good health before one enrolls for 
driving training. Until 1972, the Driving Test Unit (DTU), 
which controls the driving schools, was staffed by civilians, 
but today it is under the traffic police. In fact it was the 
Finnish road safety project, which generated awareness on the 
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need for improved driver training and testing. Today, the 
head of DTU is a Senior Superintendent of Police and is 
supposed to oversee the control and supervision of all driving 
schools as well as the examination and certification of drivers. 
To become a Public Service Vehicle driver in Kenya, the law 
requires one to be aged at least 24 years; posses at least class 
C driving license for those driving mini-buses with tare 
weight exceeding l,820Kgs and class E license for those 
driving smaller vehicles with tare weight below 1,820Kgs 
such as Nissans; have at least four years driving experience 
since obtaining the driving license; and posses a certificate of 
good conduct from the Kenya police to show that they have 
no criminal record. There is also provision that those drivers 
who acquired their driving licenses four or more years earlier 
but do not have driving experience can be retested before 
being issued with the PSV certificate. 
Chitere (2004) has established that more often the prospective 
drivers begin as touts and learn from those who already know 
how to drive. They then go to driving schools mainly to book 
driving test. Furthermore, drivers tend to work for long hours, 
in some cases up to 13 hours a day for seven days a week. 
They are also paid low wages on daily basis, lack permanent 
employment contracts, rarely stay with one employer for long, 
and operate on daily collection targets set for them by vehicle 
owners. Given casual manner in which driver training and 
certification is done, it is not surprising that drivers are the 
major cause of road crashes in Kenya as already shown in 
figure 2. 
With respect to the factors that motivate people into becoming 
drivers, Chitere (2004) established that only 1.8 per cent of 
the drivers chose to be drivers because they enjoy it while the 
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majority are driven into it by what we have chosen to refer to 
as frustration-related factors as shown in Figure 4. 
Figure 4: Motivating factors for PSV dr iver 's career 
• hfluence by others 
• Nb reason given 
• Other reasons 
• To get livelhood 
• Uherrployment 
• Enjoy it 
Source: A u t h o r ' s Reconf igu ra t ion of Data in Ch i t e re (2004) 
The capacity and competence of the driving schools has also 
been a major concern. Most driving schools are not properly 
equipped and staffed to provide effective training. At the same 
time, driver testing also lacks in rigor and can easily be passed 
even by a very weak candidate. This is partly because there 
are very few driving test examiners. As a result, one examiner 
handles too many candidates in one day. In addition, the 
conditions in most of the driving schools are appalling. To 
begin with, the driving instructors are very poorly 
remunerated, have low morale and keep asking for handouts 
from the trainees who have already paid fees to the school. It 
is those who are able to pay the instructors extra money that 
receives some semblance of good training. Due to low pay, 
the schools are unlikely to attract and retain good instructors. 
Most graduates of such schools learn how to drive on the road 
long after completing their course, and cause an average of 
about three road crashes in dense traffic zones like the city of 
Nairobi during their first month of driving. 
4 0 . 5 0 % 
1.80% 10.80% 4_50% 
37% 
5 . 4 0 % 
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Pedestrians and road transport crashes in Kenya 
Currently, pedestrians are the second greatest single cause of 
road crashes in Kenya, after drivers. 1HT (1 997) observes that 
pedestrians are the most vulnerable road users, making over 
half of the deaths in the urban areas. In Kenya, pedestrians 
generally cause crashes due to ignorance of road traffic signs 
and signals, influence of alcohol and other toxic substances, 
wrong judgments, and general lack of anticipation. 
Figure 5: Number of Road Accidents Caused by 
Pedestrians in Kenya 1994-2003 
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Cyclists and road transport crashes in Kenya 
As shown in Figure 2 and 6, cyclists are the third largest cause 
of road crashes in Kenya after drivers (Figure 5) and 
pedestrians respectively. They cause crashes mainly because 
of ignorance of road traffic signs and signals. Cyclists are also 
victims of poor road infrastructure design, which ignores their 
presence on the road. Ironically, the government licenses 
motorcycles for example, while there are no provisions for 
cyclist lanes or parking bays. Infact, both motorcyclists and 
pedal cyclists, have to struggle with motor vehicle drivers for 
road space. Yet, it has been observed that, "cycle-lanes help to 
alert drivers to the presence of cyclists and give cyclists 
greater confidence" (IHT, 1997:320). 
Working Paper No. 545 
Figure 6: Number of Road Accidents Caused 
by Cyclists in Kenya 1994-2003 
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The Institution of Highways and Transportation identifies five 
characteristics of a good cycle network: -
(i) Coherence: - The cyclist section of the road 
infrastructure must form a coherent entity, linking 
major cyclist trip origins and trip destinations; 
(ii) Directness: - cyclist routes must be as direct as 
possible; 
(iii) Attractiveness: - The routes must have adequate 
lights and offer a sense of good personal safety 
for the cyclists so that they become attractive to 
cyclists; 
(iv) Safety: - they should be designed to guarantee 
safety and minimize casualty: 
(v) Comfort: - the routes should be smooth, 
relatively flat and well maintained to provide 
some acceptable measure of comfort for the 
cyclist. 
The institution also advocates good cycling proficiency 
training to enhance cyclist safety. 
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Passengers and road transport crashes in Kenya 
Passengers cause a significant percentage of (Figure 7) road 
crashes. First, some passengers do insist on alighting from 
vehicles at some dangerous places like roundabouts, sharp 
bends or in the middle of the road. As a result, an on-coming 
vehicle may crash them, or the vehicle they are alighting from 
may be hit by another vehicle. Similarly, an on-coming 
vehicle may ram into another vehicle or swerve off the road as 
it tries to avoid hitting the alighting passenger or the vehicle 
the passenger is alighting from. Secondly, sometimes 
passengers attempt to alight from a moving vehicle, as a result 
of which they may sustain injuries. Thirdly, some passengers 
and prospective passengers also induce drivers to violate 
traffic rules for example, by shunning slow moving vehicles 
and urging drivers to speed up, or even by waiting and waving 
for vehicles to stop and carry them in non-bus stops. Finally, 
some passengers who sit on the co-drivers seat engage the 
drivers in distractive talks that make them loose concentration 
and cause crashes. Notable among the latter category include 
nagging spouses, drivers' ' long time lost friends' and female 
passengers. 
Figure 7: Number of Road Accidents Caused by 
Passengers in Kenya 1994-2003 
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Road infrastructure and road crashes in Kenya 
Although no conclusive studies appear to have been done on 
the extent to which the sorry, state of road infrastructure leads 
to road crashes, conventional wisdom indicates that the poor 
state of most Kenyan roads is a major contributing factor to 
road crashes in the country. First, there are numerous cases of 
crashes that occur when drivers try to avoid pot-holed sections 
of the road network. Secondly, crashes sometimes occur when 
drivers try to overtake other vehicles along narrow sections of 
the road. The narrowness of the road may induce risky 
overtaking especially for long distance driving along major 
routes like Nairobi-Mombasa highway and Nairobi- Kisumu 
highway. Thirdly, Kenya's road infrastructure design tends to 
ignore other road users like cyclists and pedestrians who have 
to struggle with motorists for road space at the risk of causing 
crashes. 
Fourthly, the incessant demands by some passengers to be 
dropped outside designated bus stops are partly due to the fact 
that some of the bus stops are inconveniently located and 
improperly designed. According to the Institution of 
Highways and Transportation, bus stops in densely populated 
areas should be no more than 300 meters apart. Their lay out 
should also be such that the bus can enter and leave without 
causing obstruction to flowing traffic, with clearly marked 
road re-entry lanes from the bus stop. Fifth, most Kenyan 
roads have inadequate road markings and road signs, poor 
street lightening and inadequate parking space. It is not 
surprising therefore that the Transit Transport Coordination 
Authority (TTCA) established that up to 1/3 of road crashes 
that occur in the Northern African corridor take place at night 
due to poor illumination (TTCA, 1997). 
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Section 3 
Addressing Road Safety Issues in Kenya 
Road Transport and Accident Situation in Kenya in 
2003 
The road safety picture in Kenya was very gloomy by 2003 
when the Legal Notice No. 161 was gazetted. Between 2000 
and 2003, the annual road accident fatalities averaged 2849. 
Interestingly, from the year 2000, the annual road accident 
fatalities, though considerably high, took a consistent 
nosedive from 2819 in year 2000, to 2790 in 2001 and to 2782 
in 2002. However, in year 2003 road accident fatalities 
increased for the first time in four years and passed the 
average mark of 2849 to stand at 3004. Ironically, the total 
number of road crashes by categorized road users consistently 
decreased during the same period from 10,595 in 2000, to 
10,873 in 2001 to 10,858 in 2002 and to 10,647 in 2003. 
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In fact, between 2002 and 2003 it is only crashes by motorcars 
that increased from 3931 in 2002 to 4271 in 2003. Crashes by 
major vehicles like matatus, lorries, buses, taxis, motorcycles 
and pedal cycles declined between 2002 -2003 as shown in 
figure 8 below. 
Similarly, more crashes occur daytime than at night This 
is probably because there are fewer activities at night 
than daytime. However, accident risks are as high at 
night as they are daytime. While there are more road 
users daytime, problems of visibility are more acute at 
night, yet there are buses, matatus, and until recently, 
tracks and funeral vans operating at night. Figure 9 
shows crashes by time of the day when they occur. 
Figure 9: Accident by Time of Occurance 1992-2003 
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It is also instructive to note that prior to the introduction of the 
Legal Notice No 161 of October 2003, PSV transportation in 
Kenya, particularly in urban areas was characterized by the 
existence of too many actors in the sector with no clearly defined 
roles, poor enforcement of traffic rules, inadequate road 
infrastructure and road furniture, vehicle over speeding and 
overloading, corruption, drunkenness and general disorder 
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among PSV crew, poor treatment of commuters and use of 
un-roadworthy vehicles. In a sense, the sector was chaotic, 
uncoordinated and guided largely by the laws of the jungle. 
Private Sector Road Safety Initiatives 
One of the private sector actors that have undertaken 
commendable road safety initiatives is the Matatu Owners 
Association (MOA). Formed in April 2003, MOA initiated a 
road safety awareness campaign dubbed Arrive Alive 
Program or Safiri Salama in 2004. The program was hinged 
on the slogan: Road Safety Depends on You. The program 
which was supported by Invesco Insurance Company; 
emphasized adherence to road traffic rules; non-consumption 
of alcohol and other toxic substance by road users while on or 
intending to be on the road; and reducing fatigue of drivers by 
advocating that PSV crew should not be overworked. It 
implored road users to realize that it was their individual and 
collective responsibility to ensure that they start and end their 
journeys safely. 
Although the campaign targeted all road users, it was directed 
more towards the matatu owners. The matatu owners were 
called upon to reclaim ownership of their vehicles, which they 
had long lost to cartels and matatu crew. They were required 
for example to keep track of their vehicles, know who is 
driving them at any one time and at what speed. This was 
important considering that Chitere (2004) had established that 
only 0.9 per cent of PSV vehicles are driven by their owners. 
The owners were therefore targeted because they stand to lose 
a lot in an event that their vehicles get involved in crashes, 
and therefore can play a leading role in promoting road safety. 
Furthermore, since they are the employers of the matatu crew, 
it is easier to use them to instill discipline on the crew. MOA 
whose motto is A New Beginning with Safer Roads, also 
entered into partnership with Kenya Institute of Advanced 
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Driving in mid 2004, through which they undertook driver 
training with a road safety component at the institute. In 
supporting this initiative, Invesco was driven by the 
philosophy that the insurance companies would gain more 
when road safety is enhanced since they would have fewer or 
even no compensations to make. 
The program was largely an awareness campaign and 
involved the use of mass media and stickers that portray road 
safety information. In addition, MO A organized sensitization 
meetings, as did the route-based matatu associations affiliated 
to MOA such as Nairobi-Embu Nissan Operators Sacco Ltd. 
(NENO) and Latema Travelers SACCO. The various road 
transport associations have to play a major role if road safety 
is to improve. In the matatu industry there are two major 
associations, one for matatu owners and another one looking 
into the welfare of matatu operators. A good working relation 
between these two associations has potential of ensuring 
compliance with the new road safety measures. 
Road Safety Regulations under Legal Notice No. 161 
of 2003 
The most recent effort by the government of Kenya through 
the ministry of Transport and Communications to address the 
issue of road safety was the introduction of the Legal Notice 
No. 161 of October 2003, which amended the Traffic Act Cap 
403 of the Laws of Kenya. To begin with, the Notice provides 
that every motor vehicle shall be fitted with seatbelts in every 
sitting position. Driving a motor vehicle without a safety belt 
is therefore an offence under the Act, which attracts a penalty 
of Kshs.500 for each seat lacking a safety belt. It is equally an 
offence for any one including the driver not to put on a safety 
belt while inside a moving vehicle. The Act prescribes a fine 
of Kshs.100 for every person inside a moving vehicle who 
does not put on a safety belt. While safety belts do not prevent 
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crashes from occurring, they lessen the severity of the impact 
of crashes. This measure specifically aimed at reducing the 
magnitude of injuries sustained, and the number of passengers 
who die in road crashes. 
Secondly, the Notice provides that all public service and 
commercial vehicles with tare weight exceeding 3,048 
kilograms shall be fitted with a speed governor. The speed 
governor shall be of the type approved by the minister for 
transport, and must be adjusted in such a way that at no time 
can the vehicle fitted with it move at a speed exceeding 80 km 
/hr. The measure aimed at ensuring the safety of both the 
passengers and pedestrians and enabling the drivers to be 
firmly in control of the vehicle at all times. 
Thirdly, every public service vehicle shall be painted with a 
continuous yellow band on both sides and on the rear. The 
band should be 150 millimeters in width and clearly visible 
within a distance of at least 275 meters. Where the main body 
of the vehicle is so colored that the yellow band does not 
contrast significantly, then the main body or so much of it as 
runs parallel to both sides of the yellow band, shall be painted 
a dark color of sufficient contrast as to allow the continuous 
yellow band to be visible at the said distance. While at the 
surface value this requirement might sound aesthetical, it 
aimed at making public service vehicles clearly 
distinguishable, and ensures that unauthorized vehicles do not 
carry passengers as this exposes such passengers to risk of 
accident. 
Fourth, Public Service Vehicle owners are required to indicate 
their names and address on the body of the vehicle. In 
addition, they are required to indicate the registered route 
plied by the vehicle, licensed passenger carrying capacity, and 
tare weight. 
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Fifth, Public Service Vehicle drivers and conductors are 
required to wear uniforms as well as special identification 
badges issued by the Registrar of Motor Vehicles. The drivers 
are supposed to display their photographs where all 
passengers can see them. Prior to employment as driver or 
conductor, one has to receive a certificate of good conduct 
from the police to certify that they have no criminal records. 
Furthermore each driver of a Public service vehicle is required 
to under go testing after every two years to certify their 
medical and professional fitness to continue driving. 
Finally, every Public Service Vehicle owner is required to 
employ a driver and a conductor on permanent basis and to 
pay them monthly salaries as opposed to daily wages that they 
were receiving prior to these regulations. It was hoped that 
this would prevent vehicle owners f rom imposing unrealistic 
daily targets that force the vehicle crew to make many trips 
and work late into the night to meet. It is this setting of targets 
that explains the tendency by matatus for example to always 
be in a hurry, carry excess passengers, and defy established 
traffic rules in their madness rush for passengers. 
Implementation and Enforcement of the Legal Notice 
No. 161 
Speed limit for PSV vehicles 
The Legal Notice identifies over speeding as a cause of road 
crashes, and prescribes speed governors as its remedy. It 
should be noted that Section 42 of the Traffic Act Cap 403 
already limits PSV vehicle speed to 80 km/hr even before the 
issuance of the Notice. The enforcement of this speed limit 
was however impaired by several factors. To begin with, the 
traffic police are blotted with corruption. Indeed, the 2002 and 
2003 reports by Transparency International-Kenya, ranked the 
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police as the most corrupt government agency. Studies have 
also shown that some traffic police officers own or protect 
certain PSV vehicles, which then defy traffic rules with 
impunity. Similarly, the traffic police are short of personnel 
and generally ill equipped to enforce the speed limits. The 
introduction of speed governors was in fact an admission by 
the government that the traffic police officers have been 
unable to enforce traffic rules particularly speed limits 
(Asingo, 2004). 
This study identified a few problems with the enforcement of 
the provisions for speed governors. First, although the Legal 
Notice No 161 provided that all PSV vehicles should be fitted 
with speed governors, the study established that most vehicles 
were not fitted with speed governors but instead were allowed 
to undertake engine calibration, which also reduces vehicle 
speed to a specified limit, in this case 80 km/hour. However, 
as it turned out, calibrated engines are easy to tamper with, 
and therefore, a good number of vehicles with calibrated 
engines tampered with the calibrations and reverted to the 
normal high speed. It is in this light that the minister for 
Transport and Communications imposed a ban on engine 
calibration by PSV vehicles, and directed that all such 
vehicles must be fitted with speed governors. At the same 
time a few cases were reported of vehicles either fitted with 
faulty governors or whose governors have been tampered with 
after fitting. 
Secondly, the police lack the capacity to detect a vehicle 
whose speed governor has been tampered with, unless it is 
spotted over speeding. Yet determining the speed of a moving 
vehicle is equally diff icult without equipments like speed 
guns. It is therefore possible for the police to genuinely fail to 
detect over speed ing veh ic les . Al though the corrupt ion 
spotlight is usually on the police on the road, care should be 
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taken to ensure that other speed limit enforcing agencies like 
the Motor Vehicle Inspection Unit are corruption free. 
Thirdly, the enforcement of the Legal Notice is generally 
biased against the PSV vehicles, particularly the matatus. 
Although there are speed limit specifications for all categories 
of motor vehicles, and which they often exceed, it is only the 
PSV and the commercial vehicles, which are required to be 
fitted with speed governors as a means of ensuring 
compliance with speed limit requirements. Speed governors 
therefore do not take care of over speeding by non-PSV 
vehicles, particularly small cars. Yet as shown in figure 8 
small cars remains the major cause of road crashes. 
Fourth, it was noted that the government unilaterally 
gazzettedthe companies authorized to supply speed governors 
without following competitive tendering procedures. In any 
case, since the Motor Vehicle Inspection Unit inspects 
vehicles after being fitted with governors, there is little harm 
in allowing vehicle owners to freely source the governors. 
Claims have also been made to the effect that there are eleven 
types of locally designed gadgets that have been approved by 
the Ministry of Roads and Public Works and the Kenya 
Bureau of Standards, but have been rejected by the Ministry 
of Transport on unexplained grounds, as the ministry insists 
on imported gadgets. This could have created employment 
and stimulated industrial growth. These would easily have 
been avoided if there was dialogue and consultation among 
the various road transport sector stakeholders. 
Finally, the overemphasis on speed governors may lead to a 
neglec t of o ther m e c h a n i s m s for cont ro l l ing speed. In 
countries like the United Kingdom (UK), speed cameras are 
used to regulate vehicle speeds. In the UK, local authorities 
select sites for speed cameras to be installed and maintain the 
Working Paper No. 545 
cameras. However, it is the police who provide the cameras 
and the radar equipment and install them in fixed sites to 
collect evidence of over speeding vehicles. The police install a 
radar unit, a flash-camera control unit and a camera at each 
site. The cameras take photographs of each over speeding 
vehicle at an interval of 0.5 and 1.0 second. The built-in flash 
unit allows the camera to be used at night or in poor visibility 
conditions. The radar uses the Doppler principle to measure 
speed and calculate the speed of the target vehicle at a 20 0 
Offset. The police periodically remove the films to analyze 
and identify offending vehicles. The vehicle owners are then 
given notice of intention to be prosecuted. Results have shown 
that speed cameras have a significant effect on vehicle speeds 
and accident rates (IHT, 1997:280). 
Safety belts 
Safety belts do not prevent crashes from occurring. They 
merely lessen the physical injuries sustained by passengers 
and reduce the number of passengers who die as a result of 
road crashes. Thus while speed governors target the cause of 
road crashes, seat belts target the victims of road crashes. 
Because of the hurried manner in which these reforms were 
introduced, most PSV vehicles were fitted with low quality 
safety belts. In fact, a spot check in Nairobi's Eastlands routes 
indicates that there are quite a number of vehicles without 
functioning seat belts. The emphasis on seats belts ignores 
seat stability, yet most PSV seats are merely spot-welded and 
hence in an event of a sudden violent foreword surge, the 
passenger and the entire seat can be thrown foreword. 
Evidence from our baseline survey shows that the initial 
enthusiasm with which passengers embraced the safety belts 
has significantly subsided and most passengers only adorn 
them when they see the police. This is partly due to lack of 
awareness on the part of the passengers about the importance 
of seatbelts, and partly due to the careless manner in which 
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they are handled, which leaves most of them dirty and 
generally distasteful. In a sense therefore, most passengers 
view safety belts as a legal requirement, rather than a road 
safety device. 
Like speed governors, the implementation of the safety belt 
rules have been biased against PSV vehicles. Private vehicle 
drivers and their companion are never asked about safety 
belts. In fact many personal cars are driven without safety 
belts, even for the driver. The Notice provides that driving a 
vehicle lacking safety belt attracts a fine of Kshs.600, while 
each seat without a belt attracts a fine of Kshs.500. In 
addition, being in a mobile vehicle without putting on a safety 
belt attracts another Kshs.100. This is never enforced, 
especially on personal vehicles, as the police are keener on 
offences by PSV drivers. 
Policy Gaps in Road Safety Interventions 
One of the most serious flaws in Kenya's road safety 
initiatives is the neglect of road infrastructure as a 
contributing factor to road crashes. Most of the issues 
addressed by past and current road safety initiatives can 
broadly be divided into those that deal with the behavior and 
attitudes of road users and regulators, and those that deal with 
mechanical defect on vehicles. The two categories of 
initiatives deal with what we have referred to in our 
framework of analysis as road transportation. Yet as 
demonstrated in the framework of analysis, road 
transportation together with road infrastructure constitutes the 
two functional pillars of road transport. 
T h e D r a f t I n t e g r a t e d N a t i o n a l T r a n s p o r t Po l i cy 
indicates that 85.5 per cent of road crashes are caused 
by human behavior and at t i tude , 10.5 per cent are 
c a u s e d by m e c h a n i c a l d e f e c t s of v e h i c l e s w h i l e 
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related issues. This should not be misconstrued to imply that road 
infrastructure makes a negligible contribution to road crashes, 
considering that it is not the number of crashes occurring that 
matters, but the extent of damage caused, injuries sustained and 
deaths resulting from crashes. Indeed, crashes are about human 
life and hence nothing that leads to the loss of even one life 
should be ignored in addressing road safety. The drive towards 
road safety must therefore integrate road transportation-related 
issues, with road infrastructure-related issues like road signs 
display, functioning traffic and street lights, road markings, and 
road design that embrace the needs of all road users. Such an 
initiative obviously must be multi disciplinary in nature and 
inter-ministerial in approach. 
Secondly, road safety in Kenya lacks a clear, coherent and well-
coordinated institutional framework. The Draft Integrated 
National Transport Policy proposes the creation of a National 
Transport Safety Board (NTSB) to act as a safety oversight and 
an independent accident investigator. The NTSB is to oversee 
safety issues in all transport sub-sectors including railways, 
aviation, maritime, inland waterways and pipeline. In addition, 
the policy paper proposes the setting up of a National Road 
Transport Management Authority (NRTMA), whose role will 
include, among other functions, road safety regulation. Both 
NTSB and NRTMA will be under the Department of Transport 
within the Ministry of Transport and Communications. The 
temptation to fragment government institutions dealing with road 
safety under various ministries and departments must be 
overcome for effective coordination of road safety. 
Thirdly, pedestrians are currently the greatest casua lties of road 
crashes in Kenya, yet the notice does not address their plight. 
They are largely ignorant of the traffic rules and signs, lack 
adequate safe walkways, fly-over, footbridges, pedestrian 
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crossings, and often make wrong judgments while on or near 
the road. School children appear to be the most vulnerable as 
they cross the roads routinely in groups from and to school. 
Some get tempted into crossing the road just because 
colleagues have crossed even when a vehicle is already too 
close to avoid. Some children playgrounds are also located 
dangerously close to roads, and the children run blindly after 
each other and after play items like balls, crisscrossing the 
road. No serious safety awareness campaigns, particularly 
targeting the youth seems to have been done, at least in the 
recent past. Adults are no better in terms of knowledge of road 
rules and signs. They make as many serious mistakes as the 
children or even worse. Some cross the road drunk, around 
sharp bends or even on roundabouts. 
Fourth, while the Legal Notice has several items, only about 
two directly relate to road safety. These include the 
requirements on safety belts, speed governors and display of 
photograph of the driver. The display of the driver's 
photograph was meant to ensure that the person driving a PSV 
vehicle at any given time is the one licensed to do so and to 
prevent untrained and unqualified drivers who would 
jeopardize the lives of their passengers. The rest of the 
requirements such as uniforms for drivers and conductors, 
painting continuous yellow bands on the vehicle, displaying 
name and address of vehicle owner, employment of drivers on 
permanent terms and paying them monthly salaries, indicating 
vehicle route and passenger capacity, and having special 
badges for matatu drivers and conductors are part of 
discipline, but do not directly contribute to safety. 
Fifth, the Legal Notice neglects some key emergency safety 
concerns. To begin with, the Notice is silent on First Aid kit, 
which should always be stocked and conspicuously displayed 
in all PSV vehic les for use in event of an emergency . 
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Similarly, it does not insist on PSV vehicle crew to be 
knowledgeable about first aid. In addition, exits in most high 
occupancy vehicles like buses are not facilitative in handling 
emergency cases. Ideally, vehicles with passenger capacity 
exceeding 40 people should have two doors as well as easy to 
open and close windows. Again, to avoid the obvious effects 
of fatigue, personal and PSV vehicles covering long distance 
should be co-driven. 
Sixth, the bias against PSV vehicles is further reflected in the 
fact that continuous driving of a PSV vehicle for more than 
eight hours in a 24-hour day by one driver is prohibited, while 
there is no time limit for driving personal vehicles. 
Finally, there are emerging governance issues in the 
formulation and implementation of the road safety policies. 
First, the confrontation between matatu owners and the 
government over the policies demonstrated lack of dialogue in 
the policy process. Again, the objective of the policy reforms 
remained unclear at least to the matatu owners. In fact, the 
Matatu Owners Associations (MOA) hold the view that the 
reforms were driven by the need to restore perceived lack of 
order in the industry, tame matatu owners and generate 
additional revenue for the government. 
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Section 4 
Impact of the Legal Notice No 161 Of 2003 
Impact on Road Safety 
The baseline survey shows that the implementation of the 
Legal Notice significantly reduced cases of road crashes in 
Kenya, particularly during the first few months of 
implementation of the Notice. Available data indicates that 
between January 2004 and May 2004, there was drastic 
reduction in road crashes, compared to the data for 2003 as 
shown in figure 10. However, from June 2004, road crashes 
began to escalate as people reverted to business as usual. It 
was around this time that people began to tamper with the 
speed governors and calibrated engines as enforcement of the 
notice also became relaxed. With time, non-compliance cases 
increased and by Jan 2005 about 500 PSV vehicles had been 
thrown out of the road due to non-compliance. 
Figure 10: Number of Accidents in Kenya 
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In a stakeholders workshop organized by IDS on the 27th of 
January 2005, the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Transport, 
Mr. Gerrishon Ikiara, reiterated the challenges facing the 
implementation of road safety measures. He highlighted 
issues such as tampering with speed governors and fitting of 
sub-standard gadgets, especially seat belts and speed 
governors; laxity of enforcement officers; re-emergence of 
cartels, poor infrastructure, poor driving skills and ignorance 
of Highway Code among others (Ikiara, 2005). 
One interesting observation is that the gazzettement and 
implementation of the Notice relegated the other aspects of 
road safety provided for in the Traffic Act, but not covered by 
the Notice, to relative obscurity. For example, section 103 of 
the traffic act prohibits touting, but this continued as the 
traffic police concentrated their efforts on safety belts, speed 
governors, the yellow bands and passenger capacity. In a 
sense some traffic police officers viewed the Notice as 
supplanting rather than complimenting the Traffic Act. 
Impact on the Economy and Society 
The reforms introduced by the notice had a significant impact 
on the economy. To begin with, it boosted those industries 
that support the transport sector. Leading manufacturers of 
paint like Crown Bager Paints and Sadolin reported good 
business, as PSV owners rushed to adorn their vehicles with 
the required yellow band. Small-scale artisans like vehicle 
body builders and to a small extent the tailors also benefited 
from the reforms. This was more so as vehicles had to be 
reconfigured with fewer seats fitted with safety belts. The 
PSV vehicle crew was also required to have uniforms. 
The reforms also reorganized the sector and introduced some 
order in the otherwise chaotic sector. Not only did it partially 
drive away cartels from the sector, but it also made it possible 
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to easily identify genuine PSV crew. The resultant sanity in 
the sector significantly increased the number of female crew 
in PSV vehicles in many routes. Similarly, the implementation 
of the Legal Notice reduced the -cost of insurance for PSV 
vehicles. Before the reforms, the third party insurance 
premium for Nissan matatu used to be Kshs.92, 000 if paid by 
installments and Kshs.87,000 if paid at once. At that time the 
insured risk was higher since Nissan matatus had passenger 
capacity of eighteen. The reforms however, reduced the 
passenger capacity to thirteen, thereby reducing the insured 
risk. Consequently, their third party premiums also went down 
to Kshs.74, 000 if paid by installments and Kshs.69,000 if 
paid at once. It should be noted that the third party, that is 
what most matatus can afford, only covers other vehicles 
damaged, pedestrians hit or fee paying passengers but not the 
driver, the conductor or even the vehicle itself. 
In addition, the reforms led to an influx of additional vehicles, 
mainly high occupancy vehicles. The prevailing sanity and 
order in the sector attracted many new investors, who feared 
investing in the sector due to its previous chaotic nature. 
Some operators were also displaced as they found the new 
rules too taxing. There is a feeling that the reforms have 
pushed low and middle-income investors from business at the 
expense of high-income investors, yet it has traditionally been 
business of the poor, by the poor, for the poor. 
Finally, the reforms have enabled the government to raise 
additional revenue from non-complying vehicles. In one week 
alone, from Thursday, January 14th 2005 to Friday January 
20 th 2005, the traffic police reported that the government 
managed to collect a total of Kshs. 7,654,600 as fines from 
non-compliance. The distribution of this amount by provinces 
is shown in the table below. If this is taken as the average 
Working Paper No. 545 
weekly collection, it translates into almost Kshs. 400 Million 
Annual income for the government. 
Table 1: Traffic Offence Fines for 3rd week of January 2005 
Province Amount 
Nairobi 4,625,3000 
Coast 1,260,200 
Eastern 561,500 
Western 374,600 
Central 371,300 
Rift Valley 361,700 
Nyanza 100,000 
Total 7,654,600 
During the same week a total of 2,028 vehicles were detained 
nationwide for obstruction and 779 for either operating 
without valid TLB licenses or contravening requirements of 
TLB. Similarly, 2,846 drivers, 1,264 conductors, and 746 
touts were arraigned in courts for various offences, while 
1,058 passengers were charged for not using safety belts. 
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Section 5 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
Concluding Remarks 
The measures being taken by the government shows the 
commitment and determination to address road safety issues. 
The government has initiated several legal, policy and 
institutional reforms in her quest to address both road 
infrastructural problems and transportation issues. The most 
recent road safety policy measures are subsumed in the Legal 
Not iceNo. 161 of October 2003, which emphasizes passenger 
safety and speed limits for PSV Vehicles. Apart from the road 
safety policy measures, the government in collaboration with 
key stakeholders has come up with a Road Safety Action Plan 
(RSAP) due to be launched in February 2006. The plan covers 
14 key areas' relating to road safety. 
The measures being implemented do not seem to have 
correctly diagnosed the root cause of road crashes in Kenya. 
While it increasingly becoming evident that human behavior 
and attitude significantly contribute to road carnage, neither 
the past road safety measures or the prescriptions of the Legal 
Notice No. 161 of October 2003 adequately address the 
behavior and attitude of road users and regulators. Change of 
behavior and attitude of road users and regulators has great 
potential of reducing road crashes. A vehicle can be 
mechanically sound but unless the users and the regulators 
2 The RSAP covers: road safety coordination and management, road safety 
Rinding, road crash data system, road safety research, development and 
maintenance of roads, Non-Motorized and Intermediate Means of Transport 
(NMIMT), vehicle safety standards and compliance, driver training, testing 
and licensing, traffic legislation, traffic law enforcement, road safety 
awareness, road safety awareness for children, and emergency services and 
rehabilitation. 
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observe and respect road transport regulations, the fight 
against carnage remains a mirage. 
The draft policy paper on Integrated National Transport 
Policy has isolated enhancing transport safety and security as 
a policy intervention area. The tasks for ensuring this 
intervention include: developing and enforcing vehicle 
standards through regular inspection of vehicles; developing 
training curriculum for drivers, traffic law enforcement agents 
and other road users including NMIMTs; establishing and 
enforcing regulatory framework and undertaking public 
awareness (GOK, 2004). While the latter intervention has 
potential of dealing with the behavior and attitude of road 
users, experience in Kenya shows that road users are aware of 
the rules relating to road use, but do not apply them unless 
there is an enforcement officer within sight. 
Lack of compliance with legal requirements is a major 
problem in most developing countries, including Kenya. 
Unless road users respect and observe traffic rules and 
regulations, the noble goals and objectives of road safety 
policies will be difficult to achieve. It is therefore necessary to 
study what motivates road users to develop such a high 
propensity to flout regulations and traffic rules. This task will 
be a key component of the next phase of the Institute for 
Development Studies' project on Research and Technical 
Support to Renewed Road Safety Measures in Kenya. 
Recommendations 
First, there is need to enact a Road Safety Act which will 
strengthen and bring together the various existing pieces of 
legislation on road safety. This will provide the much-needed 
legal framework for promotion of road safety in Kenya. The 
Act should for example address issues of compensation for 
v ic t ims of crashes caused by poorly const ructed public 
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utilities like bridges that give in to the weight of vehicles. It 
should also prescribe serious punitive action against drivers 
who continually cause crashes. 
Secondly, there is need to reorganize the training of drivers. 
Most attention and focus is usually directed towards how the 
PSV drivers are trained. However, it should be noted that the 
training of drivers for smaller vehicles is no better. In fact, 
rarely do trainees leave the driving schools competent to drive 
on their own. Hence there is need for regularized training and 
thorough inspection of the driving schools. 
Thirdly, there is need to facilitate organization and 
performances of various transport associations. The 
associations have potential of influencing their membership to 
comply with regulations, and avoid cutting corners, in 
particular tampering with speed limit gadgets and flouting the 
Highway Code. 
Fourthly, investigation and reporting of road crashes needs to 
be strengthened to ensure accuracy of reports and to transform 
the reports into inputs to be processed for the purposes of 
addressing road safety concerns. Currently there is a very 
weak link between the police who collect accident data and 
the policy makers who need the data to design appropriate 
response mechanisms for the problem of road safety. 
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